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Abstract 
The acquisition of artificial intelligence (AI) systems is a relatively new challenge for the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD). Given the potential for high-risk failures of AI system acquisitions, 
it is critical for the acquisition community to examine new analytical and decision-making 
approaches to managing the acquisition of these systems in addition to the existing approaches 
(i.e., Earned Value Management). In addition, many of these systems reside in small start-up or 
relatively immature system development companies, further clouding the acquisition process due 
to their unique business processes when compared to the large defense contractors. This can lead 
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to limited access to data, information, and processes that are required in the standard DoD 
acquisition approach. The well-known recurring problems in acquiring information technology 
automation within the DoD will likely be exacerbated in acquiring complex and risky AI systems. 
Therefore, more robust, agile, and analytically driven acquisition methodologies will be required to 
help avoid costly disasters in acquiring AI systems. This research provides a set of analytical tools 
for acquiring organically developed AI systems through a comparison and contrast of the proposed 
methodologies that will demonstrate when and how each method can be applied to improve the 
acquisitions life cycle for AI systems. 
Introduction 
This report seeks to address the emerging field that falls under the umbrella term 
“Artificial Intelligence” or AI, and the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) that is not designed to 
develop and procure such state-of-the-art, rapidly evolving AI technologies. Thus, the research 
examines the challenges of acquiring an AI-based system within the typical acquisitions 
framework in business and in the Department of Defense (DoD) by conducting an analysis on a 
set of recommended quantitative tools for use in analyzing the processes in the acquisition of 
organically developed DoD AI systems. Thus, this research introduces tried and true 
quantitative methods (EVM, KVA, IRM) for their application to the DoD Acquisition of AI 
systems. Therefore, this research proposes the re-examination of acquisition methods, 
strategies, and methodologies based on the category of AI being acquired. 
Acquisitions of AI systems is a relatively new challenge for the DoD. Given the high risk 
of failure for such system acquisitions, it is critical that the acquisition community examines 
potential new approaches to help manage the AI acquisition life cycle. The well-documented 
recurring problems in acquiring information technology within the DoD will likely be exacerbated 
in acquiring these leading edge, complex, and risky systems. The identification, review, and 
recommendation for the optimal use of new acquisition methodologies, to supplement or replace 
existing methodologies, should help avoid costly disasters in AI system acquisitions. In addition, 
the use of these methodologies should also create a more flexible acquisition scheme that 
allows for incorporation of unanticipated, value added components of future AI systems. Please 
note that this conference paper is an abridged version of the research conducted by Housel et 
al. (2020). For a more thorough discussion, see the full report of this research that provides a 
robust literature review, more detailed explanations, as well as the step-by-step process for 
each of the three methodologies please see the full report.2 
AI has been in use in various commercial and governmental domains to address a 
variety of decision support problems. However, existing DoD acquisition frameworks may not be 
adequate to address the unique nature of AI systems life-cycle investments. AI systems are 
qualitatively different than standard automation systems that focus on routine, repeatable tasks. 
To develop acquisition frameworks for AI systems, it is first necessary to examine how AI 
systems will be used to support, or supplant, decision-makers. The purpose of this research 
project is to provide a set of quantitative and analytically robust decision-making methodologies 
for acquiring AI systems that address the inadequacies of the current standard investment 
acquisition life-cycle framework. 
To better understand the potential contributions of this research, it is important to 
recognize the recent drive towards using innovation in improving Defense Acquisition outcomes. 
During the Cold War, the United States and particularly the Department of Defense enjoyed a 
position of prominence in the realm of military technological development. Therefore, the use of 
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the common Defense Acquisition System allowed the DoD to develop, test, and field large-scale 
weapons systems through a slow, labor intensive development process. However, the rapid 
growth of technological developments has diminished the DoD’s technological advantage over 
many of the United States’ near peer global competitors. As a result of the current challenges, 
the DoD launched several key initiatives such as “Better Buying Power 3.0,” which is “aimed at 
accelerating acquisition reform and incentivizing innovation within government,” as well as the 
Defense Innovation Initiative, and the “Third Offset Strategy” (Voelz, 2016, p. 180).    
The underlying premise behind these recent efforts is that the traditional methods of 
acquisition are less than optimal in achieving the desired outcomes in DoD weapons and 
business systems. Therefore, the goal of implementing innovation in the DoD acquisition 
process has been designed to provide the means of achieving these better acquisition 
outcomes. Some of the key attributes in the recent initiatives include adopting best practices in 
DoD labs (Sullivan, 2018) and increasing the use of rapid development cycles through 
prototyping (DiNapoli, 2019). In addition, the DoD also seeks to take advantage of the 
commercial sector’s rapid development of innovative technologies by partnering with the 
commercial development of dual use technology—technology that has application for both the 
private and defense sectors (Kendall, 2017; Voelz, 2016). It is this urgent context that provides 
a push for innovation in the DoD acquisition processes and provided the impetus for the current 
research study. 
The underlying challenge is best understood through a discussion of programmatic risk 
management requires a foundational understanding of the effect of risk on human behavior. 
Primarily, this is the effect of risk on the PM and other program leaders. The goal is to gauge 
how these principal acquisition professionals respond to risk and their aversion to risk with 
regard to acquisitions decision-making in terms of cost, schedule, and performance. Bhatt et al. 
(2005) note that a fundamental understanding of risk management addresses the question, 
“How much risk is acceptable?” (p. 64). As noted by Housel et al. (2019), “A recurring issue at 
the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is that acquisitions of information technology (IT) have 
been fraught with schedule and cost overruns. The problem is the risk and project management 
tools the DoD currently use inadequately address the fiscal and temporal overruns (p. 3).” This 
premise is supported by numerous studies on DoD acquisitions, particularly those that involve 
complex IT systems. A prime example that illustrates this issue is the multitude of reports on the 
development of space and satellite systems (Chaplain, 2017, 2019; Ludwigson, 2019). The 
issue of concern is that PMs and other managers of DoD acquisitions, particularly in the case of 
advancing cutting-edge technological systems, are increasingly becoming either overly risk 
tolerant or increasingly risk adverse.   
Thus, the motivation to be risk averse promotes a cautious culture among the DoD 
Acquisition community. As the DoD continues to develop systems that are increasingly complex, 
the risk tolerance of PMs and other Acquisition leaders is diminished in direct proportion to their 
inability to meet the program requirements for cost, schedule, and performance. It follows that 
the result of this is an organizational culture in the DoD Acquisition community that is unwilling 
to assume risk. In addition, there is tremendous pressure to push unrealistic schedule and cost 
goals and results in unforced errors in the acquisition program’s baseline. As a result of these 
unintended consequences, programs are most often more expensive, late, and/or not able to 
perform to the standards specified.   
Research and Problem Statement 
The current problem at the DoD is that the complexity and speed of decision-making is 
increasing exponentially with the advent of intelligent systems that support or that actually make 
decisions in time-critical, high-impact problem spaces. The current process management and 
control tools that a program manager (PM) might use to support acquisitions do not provide 
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adequate warning of, or provide sufficient information about the root causes of, fiscal budgetary 
overruns and time schedule delays. This is a problem because PMs are, as a result, unable to 
respond to issues in a timely manner, delaying the delivery of promised capabilities to the 
services. Additionally, the money and resources spent in excess of the original budget could be 
used in other acquisition programs. To better understand the possible causes and solutions to 
the AI acquisition problem, this study will examine the strengths and weaknesses of three 
performance and project management methodologies.  
These methodologies, Earned Value Management (EVM), Knowledge Value Added 
(KVA), and Integrated Risk Management (IRM), are used to strategically and tactically plan, 
monitor in real time, measure, and preemptively forecast the value and progress of AI 
acquisitions. A review of these recommended project analysis and control methodologies will 
offer insights into the strengths and weaknesses each approach could offer acquisition 
professionals within the general phases of the Defense Acquisition System. This research offers 
potential solutions to improve early warnings of cost and schedule overruns, and value 
opportunities foregone in the acquisition process. As such, this research focuses on the review 
of these methodologies and their applications to the acquisition process of AI systems. 
Research Objective 
The current research examines the challenges of acquiring an AI-based system within 
the common acquisitions framework in business and in the DoD. The primary objective of the 
current research is to evaluate three quantitative analysis tools for improving the acquisition of 
organically developed DoD AI systems. A comparison and contrast of the proposed 
methodologies will identify when and how each method can be applied to improve the 
acquisitions life cycle for AI systems. 
Research Questions 
The questions examined in this research are as follows: 
1. How should each proposed methodology be used throughout the AI systems 
acquisition life cycle? 
2. Will the combination of methodologies reduce the risks associated with acquiring an 
organically developed AI system? 
3. When should the methodologies be used in the acquisition life cycle to ensure 
successful acquisition of AI systems? 
4. What are the risks inherent in following a 5000 series acquisition framework when 
acquiring an organically developed AI system? 
Technical Approaches and Outcomes of the Research 
This research provides an in-depth review of each of the three methodologies (IRM, 
KVA, and EVM). While each acquisition project is unique, all must pass a series of common 
hurdles to succeed. A successful AI acquisition approach requires the support of methodologies 
that are designed to identify and value system options and forecast the future value of systems 
while assessing and mitigating investment risks. The dominant methodology for managing DoD 
acquisitions that exceed $20 million is EVM. The current structure of EVM may be enhanced 
with the addition of the IRM and KVA methodologies due to the unique needs of an AI system 
acquisition. This research examines how these three methodologies might be incorporated 
within an acquisition life-cycle framework assessing the benefits and risks of this potential 
extension of the standard framework. These methodologies have been used extensively in the 
past in acquisition research performed for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS). This current study will build on the key learnings from this prior 
research to enhance the acquisition life-cycle framework with a focus on the unique 
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characteristics of AI system acquisitions. The anticipated outcome of this research will be a set 
of guidelines for how and when to use the three methodologies to improve the potential success 
of acquisition of AI within the acquisition’s life cycle. The history of organic complex information 
technology (IT) has been characterized by cost and schedule overruns creating havoc for 
acquisition professionals as well as system designers and future users who expect to receive 
valuable new capabilities (Housel et al., 2019; Oakley, 2020). The DoD’s standard 5000 series 
acquisition life cycle will provide the context for reviewing the ways the methodologies can be 
used to enhance the acquisition life-cycle approach in managing the acquisition of AI systems. 
Artificial Intelligence (AI)  
This next section will briefly discuss Artificial intelligence (AI) in context of its current 
impact in the Defense Acquisition System through a discussion on how the three Acquisition 
methodologies (EVM, KVA, and IRM) can be utilized to assess an AI program based on its 
stage in the Acquisition life cycle. AI does not refer to a specific system. It is a broad 
nomenclature for a collection of related inorganic computer science methods used to simulate 
human intelligence. The term AI typically conjures up the general concept of machine learning, 
which is a type of AI where a computer system is programmed to identify and categorize 
external real-world stimuli via a “learning” process. The DoD’s AI strategy defines AI as “the 
ability of machines to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence—for example, 
recognizing patters, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions, or 
taking action—whether digitally or as the smart software behind autonomous physical systems” 
(DoD, 2019). This capability of enhanced automation is of great interest to the DoD as potential 
future near-peer adversaries such as Russia and China, are investing heavily in this field for 
military purposes (DoD, 2019).  
The Growth of AI Literature from Inception to Industry 4.0 
Utilizing the Web of Science comprehensive academic search engine, the researchers 
found 316,009 scholarly publications, including 188,275 academic journal articles on the topic of 
AI. The period of these AI publications covers the entire timeline from the inception of term 
“artificial intelligence” in the early 1960s until present day. Using Van Eck and Waltman’s (2020) 
VOSviewer tool for visualizing scientific landscapes, the researchers created a network map that 
showed the illustrates how AI (“intelligence” in the diagram) relates to other key topics. A 
visualization of the major key terms in AI research is depicted below in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. The Key Topics in AI from 1960 to Present Day 
Figure 1 depicts how AI relates to numerous terms that have more than 50 publications 
related to AI since it branched out of cybernetics in the 1960s. As Figure 1 depicts, AI topics 
have branched out of the general computer science and automation fields into other fields such 
as healthcare, as noted in medical terms in Figure 1. As the timeline illustrated in Figure 1, 
much of the expansion in AI topics has occurred in the past two decades. A major cause of the 
recent interest in AI in the past decade is the phenomenon known as “The Fourth Industrial 
Revolution” or “Industry 4.0” (Lee, 2013; Schwab, 2015). In noting how steam power impacted 
the agrarian society in the First Industrial Revolution, the assembly line in the Second Industrial 
Revolution, the computers in the Third Industrial Revolution, Schwab (2015) argues that society 
is on the cusp of a “technological revolution that will fundamentally alter the way we live, work, 
and relate to one another.” Schwab (2017) and his colleagues at the 2011 Hanover Conference 
on Technology made the case that impact of this new revolution is quite extensive,  
We have yet to grasp fully the speed and breadth of this new revolution. Consider 
the unlimited possibilities of having billions of people connected by mobile devices, 
giving rise to unprecedented processing power, storage capabilities, and 
knowledge access. Or think about the staggering confluence of emerging 
technology breakthroughs … such as artificial intelligence. (p. 9)  
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While much of this research focuses on the DoD Acquisition of AI, the tools this research 
proposes for the project management in developing and procure AI (KVA and IRM) have a 
broader application. 
AI in National Security and Defense Applications 
As the capabilities of AI has expanded in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, there has 
been a growing concern that the international arena, particularly the three Great Powers of the 
United States, China, and Russia, may already be in the throes of an “AI Arms Race” (Geist, 
2016). One of prevalent fears among scholars in the age of expanding AI, is the risk of 
developing “autonomous weapons” that can no longer be controlled (Geist, 2016). In essence, 
by developing AI weapon systems, humanity may be sowing the seeds of its own destruction. 
As former Secretary of State Kissinger noted on the rise of AI:  
The scientific world is impelled to explore the technical possibilities of its 
achievements, and the technological world is preoccupied with commercial vistas 
of fabulous scale. The incentive of both these worlds is to push the limits of 
discoveries rather than to comprehend them. And governance, insofar as it deals 
with the subject, is more likely to investigate AI’s applications for security and 
intelligence than to explore the transformation of the human condition that it has 
begun to produce. (Kissinger, 2019) 
Kissinger’s (2019) words strike at the heart of the growing mistrust of this new technology that 
has exploded with the recent rise of Big Data and more powerful computing. This fear may also 
grow as AI can potentially dominate international relations with a new race to develop and 
weaponize AI (Geist, 2016). 
AI and The DoD’s Third Offset Strategy 
The discussion will now shift towards the DoD’s recent drive towards AI. As the potential 
capabilities of AI became more evident, then Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel (2014) 
launched the “Third Offset Strategy.” The DoD’s Third Offset Strategy hearkens back to the 
“First Offset” launched by President Eisenhower where the United States developed its strategic 
arms to reduce the need for standing conventional forces during the early Cold War and the 
“Second Offset” where after the Vietnam War, the DoD, through programs such as DARPA, 
increased the capabilities of its conventional forces to counter the Warsaw Pact (Hillner, 2019). 
Then Deputy Secretary Work noted that it is the challenges of the current geopolitical 
environment, artificial intelligence can help reinstate the U.S. previous technological overmatch, 
“Learning machines are an example of technology that can help turn AI and autonomy into an 
offset advantage” (Pellerin, 2015). It was the Third Offset Strategy that pushed for subsets 
initiatives such as the Defense Innovation Initiative and Frank Kendall’s (2017), then Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, “Better Buying Power 3.0” 
which were focused on bringing back the competitive edge that the U.S. military once had over 
its geopolitical competitors.    
The theme that arises from the Third Offset, Defense Innovation Initiative, and Better 
Buying Power 3.0 is that the Defense Acquisition System is unable to meet the requirements of 
fielding software intensive systems such as AI systems. Kendall (2017) discussed this problem 
by illustrating the challenging that PMs with software intensive systems such as AI face due to 
the extensive cycle of developing, testing, fielding “several builds of software in various stages 
of maturity” simultaneously while dealing with the organizational bureaucracy that slows the PM 
down (p. 50).    
DoD Acquisition of New Software-Intensive Technology 
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The fielding of new and advanced technologies such as AI is a challenge for the DoD 
and all federal government. The current methodologies have proven unsuccessful in meeting 
the task of providing the requirements to the warfighter to face the challenges of the modern 
battlefield (Kendall, 2017). However, with the release of recent strategic changes such as 
implementing innovation practices and advanced prototyping, the DoD may prove up to the task 
of fielding the materiel and equipment to support the Department and the Services (Kendall, 
2017; Voelz, 2016). Some of the practices that have proven success is the adopting best 
practices in DoD labs and increasing the use of rapid development cycles through prototyping 
(DiNapoli, 2019; Sullivan, 2018). 
A recent case study on the two-decade process of developing biometrics for the use in 
the Services provides the lessons learned on comes to acquisition of new and advanced 
technology. According to Voelz (2016), “The case study of biometrics demonstrates that 
effective military innovation can only occur through an integrated approach that takes into 
account the interdependent elements of technology development, acquisition planning, doctrinal 
design, and warfighting strategy” (p. 180). While not exactly the same, the lessons learned of 
adapting biometrics in the Services is an example of how the DoD can adopt AI throughout the 
department. This is because a key attribute that biometric systems and AI systems share are 
that they are both heavily software intensive development process.   
Earned Value Management 
EVM provides cost and schedule metrics to track performance in accordance with an 
acquisition project plan. EVM is required for large DoD acquisition programs that use incentive 
contracts valued at or greater than $20 million (DoD, 2015a). EVM methodology uses a WBS to 
try to ensure that an acquisition project is on schedule and within the estimated cost for each 
work package. It is used to measure work progress and any deficiencies using cost and 
schedule metrics that also can be used to measure program performance trend analysis with a 
focus on identifying any budget and schedule deviations from plan. However, the analysis is 
done after each process or stage in the WBS. In other words, the actual cost and time spent to 
execute a particular phase is compared against the initially projected budgeted plan.  
Given the propensity of IT and AI acquisitions to be over budget and behind schedule, 
EVM metrics help PMs identify and attempt to avoid overruns and schedule deviations. 
Recognized plan deficiencies can help program managers identify waste and chokepoints that 
require immediate correction. When deficiencies in cost or schedule occur, EVM analysis can 
be used to reforecast the budget and schedule with the focus of providing PMs with up-to-date 
accurate performance information. EVM analysis uses schedule and cost estimates to find the 
Planned Value (PV) of a given acquisition project. Cumulative PV provides the total value that 
should be achieved by a specified date. The specific label for PV within the DoD acquisitions 
community is Budgeted Cost for Work Scheduled (BCWS). Actual Cost (AC) is the accumulated 
accrued costs of labor and materials at any point in time during a project. The label for AC within 
the DoD acquisitions community is Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP). Earned Value (EV) 
measures the progress for a given plan. The DoD acquisitions label for EV is Budgeted Cost of 
Work Performed (BCWP).  
In sum, EVM exists to provide an assessment of the actual physical work a project has 
completed compared to a baseline plan (Fleming & Koppelman, 2010). EVM integrates the 
actual cost spent on the project to date with the work that has been performed on the project, 
allowing managers to compare the progress of the project with their planned budget and 
schedule (Fleming & Koppelman, 2010). It provides managers the ability to compare cost 
performance with work completion rather than simply cost performance and planned cost, as is 
done in traditional cost management (Fleming & Koppelman, 2010). When properly employed, 
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EVM provides a reliable prediction of the total cost and schedule requirements for a project 
through three distinct dimensions: the planned value, earned value, and actual cost (Fleming & 
Koppelman, 2010). It is important to note the term value in EVM does not have the same 
meaning as in other methodologies, such as KVA. Within the context of EVM, value is defined 
as the work accomplished towards completion of the project. There is no reference to the quality 
of the completed work or additional (or missing) benefits the work might provide to a system. 
The value is assumed because the specifications were defined in the project requirements. 
EVM has proven to be a reliable system to manage cost and schedule performance for 
manufacturing in both defense and commercial industries. However, as systems become more 
complicated and information technology (IT) and AI gain a more prominent place within even 
traditional manufacturing projects, EVM may need additional information from additional 
methodologies to improve its capabilities. Better incorporating the strategic guidance associated 
with a program, the value gained from subcomponents and subprocesses, the risk associated 
with developing subcomponents of a system, and incrementally improving a process may help 
improve the Defense Acquisition System as a whole. 
Knowledge Value Added 
KVA is an empirical model that focuses on the practical application and implementation 
of knowledge management (Tsai, 2014). Originally developed to assist in business process 
reengineering, KVA creates an objective, quantifiable method to measure the value of a process 
or service (Housel & Kanevsky, 1995). Typical financial approaches to business process 
reengineering use the dollar amount of a final product to determine the value of an object, failing 
to account for the knowledge required in the various subprocesses involved in making the 
product (Housel & Kanevsky, 1995). In its essence, KVA performs a single function: describing 
all process outputs in common units. KVA accounts for the value of all components, processes, 
and support systems necessary to complete a task or create a product or service by describing 
all outputs in common units. It allows managers to compare the efficiency of the various steps 
across all processes within a common value reference point. 
Value has a different meaning in KVA than it does in other methodologies, such as EVM 
or IRM. KVA bases its definition of value on complexity theory and views organizational 
processes by their ability to change their input (raw material, information, energy, etc.) into 
common units of output, as shown in Figure 2 (Housel & Kanevsky, 1995). Per Figure 2, 
process P changes the input in some manner, creating a different product or service at the 
output, adding value to the system based on the number of common unit changes from input to 
output (Housel & Kanevsky, 1995). If process P did not change input X, then output Y is the 
same as input X, indicating no value was added by the system (Housel & Kanevsky, 1995). 
While the change from X to Y may be minute or large depending on the process, KVA converts 
all changes into common units, and these changes indicate the amount of value added by 
process P to produce the final product. The value generated through the process is proportional 
to the change in the state from X to Y, denoting the amount of knowledge required to make the 
changes (Yu et al., 2009). Thus, the contribution to a process is equivalent to the sum of all 
knowledge necessary to produce a product and/or interpret meaning from an input (Housel & 
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P(X) = Y 
Fundamental assumptions: 
1. If X = Y no value has been added. 
2. “value” ∝ “change” 
3. “change” can be measured by the amount of knowledge required to make the 
change. 
 
So “value”∝ “change” ∝“amount of knowledge required to make the change” 
Figure 2. Value Added Process (Housel & Bell, 2001, p. 94) 
The KVA methodology is best completed by following the seven-step process shown in 
Figure 3. Practitioners can use several methods to describe the units of change, such as tasks, 
Haye knowledge points, Shannon bits, units of knowledge, and so on (Housel & Bell, 2001). For 
ease of measurement, three measures are typically used within KVA to estimate the embedded 
knowledge within a process (Housel & Bell, 2001). Learning time, column two in Figure 3, 
measures the length of time it takes an average user to learn a process and correctly complete 
it (Housel & Bell, 2001). Process description, column three, is the number of process 
instructions used to transform the given input into the desired output (Housel & Bell, 2001). 
Each instruction must require an approximately equal amount of knowledge to complete a task 
(Housel & Bell, 2001). The binary query method uses the number of binary questions (i.e., bits) 
necessary to accomplish the process, roughly equivalent to the lines of code within a computer 
program (Housel & Bell, 2001). However, any measure that satisfies the basic concepts of KVA 
can be used to create a common-units measure (Housel & Bell, 2001). 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 343 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Figure 3. The KVA Approach (Housel & Bell, 2001) 
KVA identifies the actual cost and value of an organization’s assets (human and 
technological), standard functional areas, or core processes. KVA identifies every process 
required to produce an output, and the historical costs of those processes, the unit costs, and 
unit values of products, processes, functions, or services can be measured. By describing all 
process and subprocesses (down to the detailed level of WBS) outputs in common units, the 
methodology also permits market-comparable data to be generated; this ability is particularly 
important for nonprofits like the military and government organizations. When market 
comparables from industry are used, value is quantified in two key productivity metrics: Return 
on Knowledge (ROK) and Return on Investment (ROI). Following these steps yields a 
defensible estimate of the productivity (i.e., ROK, ROI) of a given process or set of 
subprocesses. These estimates can then be used to track progress in an EVM framework in 
terms of cost, schedule, and importantly, the value produced. The KVA estimates can also be 
used to track the volatility of a set of processes and this metric can be used in the IRM 
processes that forecast future value from, for example, an AI system.  
KVA is potentially useful tool for inclusion in the Defense Acquisition System. Since the 
DoD is not a for-profit company, it does not have revenue to judge the effectiveness of its 
programs in a monetized form. Instead, it relies on various metrics and evaluations that are not 
comparable from system to system. If the DoD implements the KVA methodology more widely, 
PMs may have a more objective measure to compare various technological solutions to fulfill 
evolving requirements. Understanding the value that a system or process provides in direct 
comparison with the value of other systems, whether they are similar or unrelated processes, 
could provide beneficial information in the decision-making, budgeting, and planning processes. 
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Integrated Risk Management 
IRM is a system developed by Dr. Johnathan Mun designed to provide management the 
ability to analyze risk associated with the development of a new project or initiative. IRM 
combines several commonly accepted analytical procedures, such as predictive modeling, 
Monte Carlo simulation, real options analysis, and portfolio optimization, into a single, 
comprehensive methodology. The methodology uses existing techniques and metrics such as 
discounted cash flow, return on investment (ROI), and other metrics within the analytical 
processes to improve the traditional manner of evaluating potential projects within a company or 
the DoD. In contrast to the other methodologies, IRM focuses on the risk involved with a 
decision. It seeks to mitigate negative effects from risk while maximizing rewards from potential 
outcomes. At its core, IRM is a technique to provide managers the best analytic information 
available to use during the real options process. Figure 4 illustrates the comprehensive IRM 
process.  
 
Figure 4. Integrated Risk Management Process (Mun & Housel, 2010) 
As depicted in Figure 4, there are eight steps within the IRM methodology: 
1. Qualitative management screening 
2. Forecast predictive modeling 
3. Base case static modeling 
4. Monte Carlo risk simulation 
5. Real options problem framing 
6. Real options valuation and modeling 
7. Portfolio and resource optimization 
8. Reporting, presenting, and updating analysis 
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While each of the individual steps provides value to a project manager, incorporating all 
of them in a contiguous approach will allow decision-makers the most effective use of the IRM 
process. 
IRM is a comprehensive methodology that is a forward-looking risk-based decision 
support system incorporating various methods such as Monte Carlo Risk Simulation, Stochastic 
Forecasting, Portfolio Optimization, Strategic Flexibility Options, and Economic Business Case 
Modeling. Economic business cases using standard financial cash flows and cost estimates, as 
well as non-economic variables such as expected military value, strategic value, and other 
domain-specific subject matter expert (SME) metrics (e.g., Innovation Index, Conversion 
Capability, Ability to Meet Future Threats, Force Structure, Modernization and Technical 
Sophistication, Combat Readiness, Sustainability, Future Readiness to Meet Threats) can be 
incorporated (Mun, 2016). These metrics can provide robust forecasts as well as mitigating risk 
via simulations that account for program uncertainties. The tools set also uses modeling to 
determine potential program benefits compared to program costs (e.g., return on investment for 
innovation or return on sustainability). Capital investment and acquisition decisions within AI 
program investment portfolios can then be made based on the resulting rigorous quantitative 
analysis (considering budgetary, manpower, and schedule constraints). Projects can be broken 
down into their detailed work breakout structure (WBS) and tasks, where these tasks can be 
combined in complex systems dynamic structures or implementation paths. The cost and 
schedule elements for each task can be modeled and risk-simulated within the system to 
estimate the resulting total cost and schedule risk of a given AI acquisition program. Portfolio 
management is often integrated with IRM methods to provide a more holistic view in terms of 
acquisitions of IT and AI acquisition programs. 
The IRM methodology is a systematic technique to determine the best possible projects 
to pursue based on the statistical likelihood of their success. Using historical knowledge of 
defense acquisition programs and AI systems in both the government and commercial realms 
could improve the budgeting and scheduling processes. Determining the likely range of 
outcomes through dynamic statistical modeling may improve the program’s performance. By 
better understanding the risk associated with various components, a more appropriate schedule 
and budget could be developed. IRM may also help determine which real options should be 
included in acquisition contracts. A high-risk program may need more options, such as the 
options to abandon, delay, or expand, based on its actual performance. Finally, IRM could prove 
useful in portfolio management, helping decision-makers determine which programs to initiate 
when viewing the portfolio of other programs in progress and used operationally. 
Acquisition Life Cycle & AI 
 Housel et al. (2019) noted that the DoD 5000 series Acquisition Life Cycle (see Figure 5) 
can be aligned to the generic technology investment life cycle. As depicted in Figure 6, while 
terminology differs between the DoD 5000 and generic technology life cycle phases, the 
sequence of activities in these respective life cycles are congruent.   
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Figure 5. The 5000 Series Acquisition Life Cycle (DoD, 2017) 
 
 
Figure 6. Aligning the Generic and 5000 Series Life Cycles (Housel et al., 2019) 
 
Housel et al. (2019) noted that the acquisition methodologies, to include EVM, KVA, 
IRM, and others may be used “concert,” however, “certain tools are more appropriate for a 
particular phase than others” (p. 48). Thus, the PM and should “use the tools appropriately in 
that they provide more information for a complex environment” (Housel et al., 2019, p. 48). 
Therefore, during the beginning of the life cycle such as the Pre-Materiel Solution Analysis, the 
Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA), or the Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) 
phases, methodologies that such as IRM and KVA may be of more use to the PM as they 
provide quantitative value metrics such as a common unit assessment of the technology and 
risk, as opposed to EVM that only measures cost. Meanwhile, during the main implementation 
phases of Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) and Production and 
Development (PD), all three metrics—EVM, KVA, and IRM—can provide useful data to assess 
the program. However, during the post-implementation or Operations and Support (OS) phase, 
KVA is more likely to provide useful data over EVM.   
Comparison of Acquisition Methodologies in AI Development 
In a recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) on AI it was noted that “standing 
DoD processes—including those related to standards of safety and performance, acquisitions, 
and intellectual property and data rights—present another challenge to the integration of military 
AI” (Sayler, 2020, p. 16). As discussed earlier in the report, the difficulty of traditional Acquisition 
methods in relation to emerging technology such as AI is the speed the development and 
deployment of these technologies often outpaces the Defense Acquisition System. When 
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compared to the commercial sector, the DoD process for developing and fielding its AI systems 
has a mismatch between when compared to the timelines for its requirements. This is likely 
because there is a stark contrast with “the pace of commercial innovation and the DoD’s 
acquisition process” (Ilachinski, 2017, p. 1). This is because it takes an average of 91 months, 
or 7 and a half years, to go from the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to the Initial Operational 
Capability (IOC; Ilachinski, 2017). The Defense Science Board (2018) found the DoD’s timeline 
for fielding systems is multiple times longer than the commercial sector which uses an iterative 
process to field AI systems in approximately 6 months. As noted in the RAND Report that 
assessed the DoD’s posture for AI: 
Our starting point at the onset of our study was the DoD model of technology 
development, procurement, fielding, and sustainment, giving rise to two dimensions of 
posture assessment related to technologies: advancement and adoption. However, as 
we carried out our study, it became clear that this model is not valid for AI, owing to the 
spiral nature of AI technology development. (Tarraf et al., 2019, p. 51)   
Because of the challenges of procuring and fielding AI systems, the CRS Report reached the 
conclusion that the “DoD may need to continue to adjust its acquisitions process to account for 
rapidly evolving technologies such as AI (Sayler, 2020, p. 17). Similarly, the RAND Report also 
noted that the DoD should utilize and adapt acquisition approaches that are “appropriate for the 
technology” (Tarraf et al., 2019).   
One method that the DoD can adjust or adapt its acquisition process and/or approach is 
to adapt and utilize the Acquisition methodologies based on the complexity of the development. 
As noted by Ilachinski (2017) and the Defense Science Board (2018), AI systems development 
processes tend to be iterative in their approach. Thus, the need for rapid development and 
prototyping is likely to be utilized more than in traditional Acquisition Life Cycles (Tarraf et al., 
2019). However, despite being iterative in nature, the techniques recommend by Housel et al. 
(2019) of using EVM, KVA, IRM, or a combination of using various methodologies in concert 
can also be applied to the Acquisition of AI systems as shown in Table 1. 
 










Mature Technologies X   X 
 
Iterative Development     X  X   
Complex AI Systems   X 
 
            X                              X 
Non-Complex AI Systems  X            X 
 
Note. Iterative Development is for AI systems that are either prototypes or have rapid generational 
development cycles (i.e., versions). 
For the mature technologies and/or non-complex AI systems, because there is typically 
less risk in these life cycles, the PM can follow the normal of the EVM methodologies to monitor 
the progress of the development. However, the PM can also choose to utilize KVA to assess the 
AI systems with its common unit of value.   
Comparison of Key Attributes 
Choosing a methodology should depend on the nature of the project under 
consideration, specifically, the commitment needed from the organization, the organization’s 
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desire to align strategic goals with the project, the predictive capability of the methodology, the 
flexibility required, and the time available. While others in the organization need to understand 
the concepts to comprehend status reports, EVM only needs the management team to track the 
cost and schedule of the project compared to the baseline as there is no determined goal 
alignment with the organization. While the CPI and SPI can help estimate the final cost and 
schedule, there is no true predictive ability associated with EVM since the assumption is that the 
schedule will proceed according to the baseline, regardless of previous performance volatility. 
Adherence to the baseline is essential in EVM, and changing requirements can drastically alter 
a baseline, reducing the effectiveness of the methodology. Setting up, monitoring, and reporting 
the cost/schedule performance of each work package within the WBS can be a time-consuming 
and expensive task for an AI project with its many unknowable components and capabilities a 
priori.  
KVA needs only the KVA analyst and the process owner, as the SME, to determine the 
value of a process or component output, supporting the need to align the project with an 
organization’s productivity goals. Using this analysis, they can model the current baseline as-is 
process ROK and compare it with the proposed to-be process model ROK, thus offering a 
simple prediction of the improvement between the models. Since KVA can be used with any 
language of description that defines the process outputs in common units, analysts can choose 
whichever method is most beneficial for the particular system in question, providing flexibility. 
This analysis can be completed quickly, potentially providing a rough-cut assessment within a 
few days.  
IRM requires the organizational leadership, portfolio and project managers, and the 
analyst to determine how a project fits within an organization’s portfolio, the present value (PV) 
of the project, and potential real options. By analyzing and simulating various scenarios, IRM 
provides a prediction of a project’s likely performance, which allows managers to build in 
flexibility via real options at the appropriate locations within the project. Assuming the data 
necessary for the analysis is available, the process can be completed in a relatively quick 
manner.  
Methodologies in AI Acquisition 
As previously discussed, the methodologies all have strengths and weaknesses, making 
them more suitable in certain applications than others. The biggest challenge in using EVM 
when acquiring AI is the iterative nature of software development. EVM needs clearly stated, 
detailed requirements for intermediate steps to be most effective. While the outputs of software 
programs are defined well, the steps required to build the software are not, leading to problems 
when developing cost and schedule estimates. If the software is not complex or consists of 
known processes, EVM can sufficiently monitor the progress. Integrating software and hardware 
is also complicated with EVM since there are numerous pieces of the program that must be 
combined to meet the goals, resulting in additional debugging and recoding. EVM is more 
efficient when used to manage the physical creation of systems or infrastructure. It can monitor 
the cost/schedule progress of software work packages but is not as useful at estimating the 
value of those programs.  
KVA can provide an objective, ratio-scale measure of value and cost for each core 
process and its subprocesses or components within any IS system. Using the two parameters, 
managers can then analyze productivity ratios information, such as ROK and ROI, to determine 
the efficiency of a process compared to the resources used to achieve the output. This can help 
the manager decide how to use resources to update systems or estimate the future value of a 
system being acquired. Combining the KVA results with IRM allows managers to iterate the 
value of system real options analysis through simulation and other techniques. IRM can also 
quantify risks and forecast performance probabilities for measures of the potential success for 
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programs and components of programs using historical data. It is a tool to assist with the 
investment strategy, making it useful when acquiring all types of AI. However, it is not designed 
to help manage the actual acquisition of an AI program or determine how to meet its detailed 
requirements. 
Examining the benefits and challenges of the proposed methodologies demonstrates the 
scope, capabilities, and limitations of various AI systems. It also helps inform in which areas and 
phases of the Defense Acquisition System life cycle it may be appropriate to include the 
methodologies or components of the methodologies within the system. The main research 
question of this study was, simply, how can certain advanced analytical decision-making 
methodologies be used in the acquisition life cycle to complement existing methods to ensure a 
successful acquisition of AI technologies? 
As discussed, EVM remains the only program management methodology required by the 
U.S. government for all DoD acquisition programs with a contract value exceeding $20 million. 
Regardless of this requirement, EVM is a methodology that provides a structured approach to the 
acquisition of IT via program management processes that can help ensure an acquisition program 
stays on schedule and within budgeted cost estimates. However, there are significant limitations 
when using EVM for AI acquisitions, the major weakness being that it was not designed for 
managing AI acquisitions that follow a very iterative and highly volatile pathway. Organic AI 
acquisitions require a high level of flexibility to deal with the unknowns that arise during the 
development process as well as value adding possibilities not in the original plan. In addition, 
EVM does not provide a common unit of value metric to enable standard productivity metrics, 
such as ROI. When value is inferred by how consistent a program is with original baseline cost 
and schedule estimates, the performance of the program may be sacrificed in terms of the quality 
of the outputs when planned program activities become iterative, as in the development of many 
AI programs. If an AI acquisition program is trending toward cost and schedule overruns, but the 
resulting value added of the modifications to the original requirements provides disproportionate 
increases in value, EVM is not designed to recognize this increase in value.  
To remedy these shortcomings of EVM in AI acquisitions, the methodology should be 
combined with KVA and IRM, which can be useful during the requirements and monitoring phases 
of EVM by ensuring that a given AI acquisition is aligned with organizational strategy and that a 
baseline process model has been developed for establishing current performance before 
acquisition of an AI system. A future process model that estimates the value added of the 
incorporation of the AI can also set expectations that can be measured against the baseline model 
after the AI has been acquired. IRM can be used to forecast the value of strategic real options 
flexibility that an acquired AI may provide so that leadership can select the options that best fit 
their desired goals for the AI in defense core processes.  
Because it provides an objective, quantifiable measure of value in common units, KVA 
should also be used in AI acquisitions to allow decision-makers to better understand and compare 
different strategic options based on their value and the cost. Obtaining a return on investment of 
AI systems can only be done when using KVA to determine the value embedded in the system. 
This information provides insight to PMs as well as a more complete perspective regarding the 
performance of both the current and the to-be systems. 
Likewise, using IRM is recommended when acquiring AI through the Defense Acquisition 
System. Applying dynamic and stochastic uncertainty and risk-based modeling techniques to 
predict likely and probabilistic outcomes can improve the risk estimates associated with the 
components and subcomponents of a program, in terms of their potential cost overruns, value 
variabilities, and schedule delays. Analyzing various real options within the context of the models’ 
outputs will help PMs make the most advantageous choices when determining a program’s future. 
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PMs should use EVM only in the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) 
phase, as is currently done. That said, EVM will work best in hardware manufacturing solutions 
with technology that is fully mature prior to the program starting. Since many AI acquisition 
programs consist of advancing the current technology and developing new software solutions to 
meet requirements, EVM is not perfectly suited for AI development. Nevertheless, PMs can use 
various agile EVM techniques to complete projects on cost/schedule baselines provided the 
appropriate steps are taken when establishing the baseline. Requirements must be broken into 
small, easily definable tasks with suitable risk and uncertainty factors accounted for within the 
schedule. Other methodologies, such as KVA and IRM, should be used with EVM to ensure these 
factors are based on defendable metrics rather than simply guessing how much additional time, 
money, and value may be necessary to complete complex tasks. 
During the Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) phase, KVA and IRM will help determine the 
value of the different options considered in the analysis of alternative (AoA) process. KVA can 
objectively measure the value of the current, as-is system and the potential to-be systems under 
consideration. Then IRM can use additional factors to value the alternatives in terms of their 
relative parameter values such as cost, value, complexity, timeline. As the chosen solutions 
mature during the Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase, an updated KVA 
analysis will reassess initial estimates and provide a projected ROI that can be incorporated in an 
IRM risk and real options analysis for the AI solution prior to entering the EMD phase as 
appropriate. 
Limitations and Future Research 
This research examined whether the various methodologies—EVM, KVA, and IRM—
could be used within the Defense Acquisition System to improve the acquisition of AI. Future 
research should examine how these methodologies may interact with or improve other 
components of the acquisition system. This includes the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) and Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) 
components as individual processes and the interaction of JCIDS, PPBE, and the Defense 
Acquisition System as a whole. Certain methodologies, specifically IRM, may be more beneficial 
when used throughout the entire acquisition process instead of within a portion of the system. 
Additionally, future research could examine how these different methods may be used in the 
acquisition of products outside the AI or IT realm. 
The research conducted looked at AI as a whole and not specific types of AI. Future 
studies should examine if acquisition methods, strategies, and methodologies should change 
based on the category of AI being acquired. This is of specific interest when considering artificial 
intelligence and its subsets. Machine learning, intelligence with a specific focus or field of 
expertise, and general or universal intelligence would likely have different methods used in the 
acquisition process based on their complexity, complicated nature, undeveloped technology, and 
level of risk. 
The applicability of these methodologies within commercial acquisition of AI is another 
area of potential research. This research focused exclusively on the application of the respective 
techniques within the DoD acquisition process. However, commercial entities also struggle when 
acquiring complex or complicated AI and IT systems, particularly when the systems operate at 
the enterprise level. Further research may indicate if these same methodologies could provide 
value to decision-makers in the private sector during the creation, adoption, or customization of 
commercial AI. As noted earlier, the hype cycle for AI and automation is on the rise and the 
demand to procure such technologies is as relevant for the commercial sector as it is for the DoD. 
Furthermore, the recent pandemic caused by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) has 
forced a permanent shift in society towards an increased trend towards a permanent remote 
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workforce. As these trends are likely to continue in the foreseeable future, an increased in 
automation tools will be required to support this workforce. These trends could be explored for 
their implications as part of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and Industry 4.0. 
Finally, this research only examined the most promising methodologies out of numerous 
different possibilities. Future research could examine other program management tools, 
management philosophies, analytic tools, or other methodologies and their benefit when acquiring 
AI. While the examined methodologies were chosen because they would likely benefit the process 
and support improvements in EVM, other systems may be more appropriate in certain phases or 
may offer additional benefits not seen in this research. 
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